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Analyzing systems during the conceptual stages of design for characteristics 
essential to the ease of fault diagnosis is important in today's mechanical systems 
because consumers and manufacturers are becoming increasingly concerned with cost 
incurred over the life cycle of the system.  The increase in complexity of modem 
mechanical systems can often lead to systems that are difficult to diagnose, and 
therefore require a great deal of time and money to return the system to working 
condition.  Mechanical systems optimized in the area of diagnosability can lead to a 
reduction of life cycle costs for both consumers and manufacturers and increase the 
useable life of the system. 
A methodology for completing diagnostic analysis of mechanical systems is 
presented. First, a diagnostic model, based on components and system indications, is 
constructed.  Bayes formula is used in conjunction with information extracted from the 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FT A), component 
Redacted for Privacyreliability, and prior system knowledge to construct the diagnostic model.  The 
diagnostic model, when presented in matrix form, is denoted as the Component-
Indication Joint Probability Matrix.  The Component-Indication Joint Probability 
Matrix presents the joint probabilities of all possible mutually exclusive diagnostic 
events in the system. 
Next, methods are developed to mathematically manipulate the Component-
Indication Joint Probability Matrix into two matrices, (1) the Replacement Matrix and 
(2) the Replacement Probability Matrix.  These matrices are used to compute a set of 
diagnosability metrics.  The metrics are useful for comparing alternative designs and 
addressing diagnostic problems to the system, component and indication level, during 
the conceptual stages of design.  Additionally, the metrics can be used to predict cost 
associated with fault isolation over the life cycle of the system. 
The methodology is applied to a hypothetical example problem for illustration, 
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1  Introduction 
Henry Ford, one of the most famous designers and engineers of all time, had 
perfected the techniques of concurrent engineering and design for X long before these 
terms were officially coined. In his book, My Life and Work, his objectives and goals 
in design and production of the Model T are presented.  Ford designed for simplicity 
in operation, for absolute reliability, and for high qUality.  In addition, Henry Ford also 
desired to create an end product that could be easily serviced.  Ford states, 
The important feature of the new modeL .. was its simplicity.  All 
[components] were easily accessible so that no skill would be 
required for their repair or replacement. .. it ought to be possible to 
have parts so simple and so inexpensive that the menace of 
expensive hand repair work would be entirely eliminated ... it was 
up to me, the designer, to make the car so completely simple ... the 
less complex the article, the easier it is to make, the cheaper it may 
be sold ... the simplest designs that modem engineering can 
devise.... Standardization, then, is the final stage of the process.  We 
start with the consumer, work back through the design, and finally 
arrive at manufacturing [Bralla 1996]. 
As described in the previous quotation, characteristics vital to the ease of service 
and maintenance were designed into the Model T from the conceptual stages. 
Unfortunately, many of the design philosophies that Henry Ford perfected in his 
designs have been lost in today's mechanical systems. 2 
Without question, the mechanical systems of today have evolved into complex 
systems since the Model T.  Consumer's desire for a greater number of functions and 
higher performance can lead to an increase in system complexity.  The increase in 
complexity can often lead to designs that are not easily manufactured, serviced, 
maintained, or assembled. 
Over the past decade an effort has been put forth on many issues pertaining to the 
concurrent design of products.  Extensive research has been devoted to areas of 
assembly and manufacturing in design.  As a result, formal methodologies have been 
developed to optimize systems in the area of assembly and manufacturing.  These 
design tools provide an efficient and precise technique to optimize the design and 
design process of mechanical systems.  Design for assembly (DFA), perhaps the most 
mature of these formal methodologies, has proven to bring a significant cost savings in 
production.  DFA can, but not always, lead to an increase in reliability, but also may 
lead to designs that are more difficult to service.  Despite the increase in system 
reliability, costs associated with service over the life cycle may offset the reliability 
benefit [Gerhenson 1991].  Less effort has been focused on design characteristics 
associated with the service and maintenance of mechanical systems.  As a result, the 
development of formal methodologies in the areas of service and maintenance has 
lagged significantly behind. 
1.1  Motivation for Diagnosability Analysis 
Diagnosis of failures in electromechanical systems is costly in both time and 
money.  Therefore, designing products with diagnosability optimized is becoming 3 
increasingly important in today's mechanical systems.  Consumers and manufacturers 
are becoming increasingly concerned with costs associated with the entire life cycle of 
the product.  Products with lower life cycle costs benefit consumers and 
manufacturers.  Customers will incur fewer costs throughout the product life cycle, 
resulting in increased customer satisfaction, increased customer loyalty, and in tum an 
increase in revenue to the manufacturer.  Additionally, manufacturers will incur fewer 
costs during warranty periods, resulting in longer warranty periods; a benefit to the 
customer. 
The ability to isolate diagnosability difficulties and recommend areas of 
improvement during the conceptual stages of mechanical systems design will lead to a 
more efficient fault isolation process, and thereby reduce the total life cycle costs to 
the consumers and manufacturers, increase safety, and reduce system downtime. The 
inefficiency of fault isolation in mechanical systems serves as the primary motivation 
for exploring diagnosability improvement in mechanical systems. 
1.2  Research Goals 
Design for diagnosability is the area of design that focuses on decisions made 
throughout the design process, and how they affect the diagnosability of a system. 
Systems can be analyzed during the conceptual stages of design, and in tum decisions 
can be made to optimize the design in the areas of diagnosability.  Design for 
diagnosability can be approached from two different perspectives.  The first method, 
known as achieved diagnosability, improves diagnosis and maintenance procedures 
and incorporates electronic diagnostics into systems all ready in use.  Achieved 4 
diagnosability, as defined by Simpson and Sheppard [1994] is the ability to observe 
system behavior under the observation of testing stimuli.  This is a passive approach to 
the diagnosability optimization, requiring engineers to manage the errors designed into 
the system. 
The second approach is to optimize the inherent diagnosability of a system from 
the conceptual stages of design.  Inherent diagnosability is based on changes in the 
architecture, and their affect on the overall diagnosability of the system.  Our efforts, 
in this research, are focused on the inherent diagnosability of mechanical systems. 
This research investigates the effect of indication uncertainty on accurate failure 
diagnosis.  The goal of this research is the development and refinement of 
methodologies for measuring and predicting inherent diagnosability. Specifically, 
methodologies are developed to analyze the distinguishability (observation phase) of 
mechanical systems during the conceptual stages of design and to systems all ready in 
use.  The diagnostic methodologies developed will ultimately predict the probability 
of correctly diagnosing failures in mechanical systems.  These methodologies will 
enable designers to predict life cycle costs, areas that cause problems in the diagnostic 
process, and possible improvements to be made to the system. 
1.3  Overview of Research 
In section 2 of this paper, we will briefly present the fault diagnostic process of 
mechanical systems.  An overview of the observation phase is presented to develop a 
better understanding of the analysis methods developed. 5 
Figure 1.1 is an overview of the diagnostic analysis methodology developed in 
this research.  Three matrices are developed to complete diagnostic analysis of 
mechanical systems. 
Replacement
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Figure 1.1. Overview of Diagnostic Analysis Methodology. 
The first matrix that is formed is the Componell/-Indicatio" 10im Probability 
Matrix (I).  The matrix represents a diagnostic model of the system.  In section 3 the 
information used for constructing the diagnostic model is presented.  The Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FrA), component 
reliability, and indications certainty are used to construct the Component-Indication 
Joint Probability Matrix. The modeling and underlying mathematics for incorporating 
uncertainty into the diagnostic model are developed.  Bayes' theory and truth tables 6 
are presented to incorporate uncertainty into the diagnostic model of a physically 
embodied system.  The diagnostic modeling methodology is applied to a hypothetical 
illustrative example. 
Next, the Replacement Matrix (II) is constructed by applying replacement 
criterion to the Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix.  The Replacement 
Matrix represents the component that will be replaced during the diagnostic process 
(see section 4.1). 
Finally, the Replacement Probability Matrix (III) is computed by matrix 
multiplication of the Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix and the 
Replacement Matrix.  The diagnosability metrics are extracted directly from this 
matrix.  Diagnosability metrics are introduced in section 4.  The illustrative example is 
again utilized to verify the analysis method and the diagnosability metrics.  The 
diagnosability analysis results of the illustration example and a discussion of those 
results are provided in section 5. 
In section 6, the diagnosability methodologies and metrics are applied to the 
icemaker validation example.  The analysis is completed for varying indication 
certainties.  The diagnosability results for the icemaker validation example are 
discussed (see section 6.2). 
This research builds upon previous research conducted in the area of system 
diagnosability.  Methodologies are refined and new research topics are introduced and 
explored to benefit the areas of predicting system diagnosability. 7 
1.4  Background Research 
[Gerhenson 1991] presents a systematic methodology to balance serviceability, 
reliability, and modularity during the conceptual stages of design.  Serviceability 
design is used in conjunction with DFA to create a design that has enhanced life-cycle 
qualities and production benefits.  A methodology is developed to analyze mechanical 
system serviceability in both quantitative and qualitative ways.  Finally, Gerhenson 
examines the tradeoffs between service costs and other life-cycle costs. 
Ruff [1995] presents the method of mapping a system's performance 
measurements to system parameters.  Performance measurements are the visible 
indications that monitor whether the intended function of the component is or is not 
being performed.  Performance measures can be indications from lights, gauges, 
human observations, etc. Parameters refer to the system components that are 
measured. The parameters can be valves, controllers, ducting, or actuators. The 
diagnosability of the system is directly related to the interdependencies between 
measurements and parameters. 
Clark [1996] extends Ruff  s distinguishability metric to evaluate competing 
design alternatives.  Clark presents metrics to compute the probability of failure for 
the components.  This, in tum, is used to predict how difficult the system is to 
diagnose.  The total diagnosability is computed using the average number of 
candidates for a given failure and the diagnosability of each component.  The 
diagnosability of the system is a function of the total number of failure indications, the 
number of components, and the number of component candidates for each indication 
set.  Clark develops Weighted Distinguishability (WD) to represent the 8 
interdependencies between components and indication sets.  Clark extends the 
example of the BACS to determine how diagnosability varies in competing designs. 
Wong [1994] presents a diagnosability analysis method that minimizes both time 
and cost during the conceptual stages of design.  The analysis emphasizes the expected 
time to diagnose an indication and the expected time to diagnose a system.  The 
method is used to select competing designs in order to optimize the design.  The 
results from Wong's method show that the system diagnosability can be improved by 
changing the LRU-function relationships.  Wong develops a checking order index to 
determine the order of checking of each system component.  The index is calculated 
by dividing the probability of failure by the average time to check that specific 
component.  Wong applies the method to an existing and redesigned bleed air control 
system (BACS). 
Murphy [1997] developed prediction methods for a system's Mean Time Between 
Unscheduled Removals (Unjustified) (MTBURunj). The MTBURunj metric is a 
significant component attribute in doing diagnosability analysis. This present research 
will broaden the methodology that Murphy began in predicting MTBURunj.  The 
methods developed emphasize the ambiguity associated with system components and 
indications.  The metrics are applied to the BACS using historical data.  Multiple 
design changes are made to the BACS to determine the effect on system 
diagnosability. 
Fitzpatrick [1999] develops an analytical model to determine the reliability and 
maintainability costs over the life cycle of the product.  The goal of the research is to 
determine the effects that design changes may have on the total life-cycle cost of 9 
competing designs.  Fitzpatrick develops methods for predicting Mean Time Between 
Failures (MTBF) and Mean Time Between Maintenance Actions (MTBMA) in addition 
to MTBURunj•  The metrics can be used to determine cost for each component and the 
total expected cost of the system.  The metrics are applied to the BACS to verify the 
metrics. 
Henning [2000] develops matrix methods with which the probability of  justified 
and unjustified removals is computed.  A diagnosability model is constructed using the 
information gained from the FMEA.  Matrix notation is used to describe the 
diagnosability model mathematically.  Failure rate and replacement matrices are 
formed from component-indication mapping and replacement criterion, and 
mathematically manipulated to form the replacement rate matrix.  The diagnosability 
metrics are computed from the replacement rate matrix.  Diagnostic fault isolation is 
based solely on observation, not on diagnostic testing. 
Simpson and Sheppard [1994] devote System Test and Diagnosis to the study of 
diagnosis and test in electronic systems.  They introduce background and motivation 
to the development of the discipline.  A historical perspective is provided about the 
formal methods all ready developed and research areas to come.  Strategies for 
analyzing diagnosability are presented.  They introduce bottoms up and top down 
strategies for system modeling.  Advanced topic in the area of diagnosis where inexact 
diagnosis, fuzzy logic, and neural networks are presented.  Case studies are provided 
throughout the book to present the topics, tools, and methods introduced.  Simpson 
and Sheppard introduce highly mathematical and theoretical analysis of diagnosis to 
electronic applications. 10 
Simpson and Sheppard [1998] organize a collection of technical papers written by 
researchers and scientists in the area of diagnosability and testability.  The papers 
discuss subjects in the area of theoretical diagnosability from many different 
perspectives. 
In both Simpson and Sheppard books the area of diagnosis is applied to complex 
electronic systems.  Although much of the same terminology can be interchanged 
between mechanical and software diagnostic analysis, they are very different 
processes.  Simpson presents a series of tests to be conducted on an electronic system. 
The tests have a known input signature and a known output signature for components 
that are good.  However, when a component is faulty, the signature changes.  A set of 
comprehensive tests is conducted on the electronics to verify their condition.  These 
tests require little time to complete, thereby resulting in a large number of tests. 
However, the observation phase is of little help to fault isolation in electronic systems. 
In mechanical systems, however, observations provide a great deal of information 
on the status of the system.  Components are larger and the observations of indications 
and components allow conclusions to be drawn about the state of a mechanical 
system.  For this reason, new methodologies of fault diagnosis in mechanical systems 
are presented focusing on the observation phase. 
1.5  Conventions 
In this research the conventions for analysis are the following: 
• 	 Use the single failure assumption; one and only one component is 
assumed to be the cause of the system failure. 
• 	 Indications are binary events; the indication is either pass or fail. 11 
2  Diagnosis of Failures in Mechanical Systems 
The underlying goal of mechanical system diagnosis is to identify possible causes 
of failure, narrow down the possible causes of failure to one component, replace the 
particular component that causes failure, and return the system to normal operating 
condition.  However, because of system architecture, indication uncertainty, time 
constraints, or cost constraints it is not always possible to isolate the cause of failure to 
one particular component.  Once the fault is isolated to the fewest possible causes of 
failure, the maintenance technician must decide whether to replace a component or 
not. 
In this research, we will focus on the observation phase associated with failure 
diagnosis.  The observation phase involves noting failure indications and conducting 
maintenance tasks based on the observed indications.  The indications can be in the 
form of lights and gages or observable abnormalities noticeable to the performance of 
the system (i.e. lower performance of engine, loud noise) [Henning 2000]. 
Weare led to conclusions and possible causes of failure based on the 
observations.  An example of this is the warning lights and gages located on the 
dashboards of modem automobiles.  Operators can monitor the state of the vehicle and 
diagnose a problem without conducting diagnostic tests on the vehicle.  A check 
engine light on a car infers a specific set of components that may cause the indication 
light to appear.  All possible causes of failure in the system for each failure indication 
are defined as an ambiguity group [Simpson 1994]. 12 
Modern airplane systems have many sensors and Built-In Test Equipment (BITE) 
to locate and isolate system failures to a smaller subset of components in the system. 
Upon initial analysis of a Boeing air supply system it was determined that there is an 
average of one component failure mode per indication.  In the fault diagnosis process 
of the Boeing system, the observation phase provides information needed to isolate the 
faults to only a few components with a high level of accuracy [Boeing 2000]. 
We will discuss the idea of  justified and unjustified maintenance actions as it 
relates to diagnosis of failures in mechanical systems.  The maintenance actions are 
presented for a simplified example when indications are perfect and for an example 
when there is some error associated with each indication.  If a system indication infers 
fail, the maintenance technician may decide to replace or leave a component that could 
have caused the failure indication.  Perfect indications infer good when all components 
mapped to the particular indication are good and infer fail when at least one 
component is bad. Ifthe technician replaces the component that caused the indication 
to infer fail, it is defined as ajustified removal.  Ifthe component that is replaced is 
good, and therefore did not cause system indication to infer fail, then it is an 
unjustified removal.  Unjustified removals, for perfect indications, are a result of the 
ambiguity associated with each indication. 
However, the assumption that indications are perfect is not realistic.  The fact is 
that indications are not 100 percent perfect, resulting in indications that infer fail when 
all components mapped to the indication are good.  Therefore, unjustified removals of 
good components can be attributed to both ambiguity for each indications and 
indication certainty.  Indication error can result from a variety of sources, including 13 
human error, experience of the technician, faulty equipment, environmental 
abnormalities, and ambiguous readings [Bukowski 1993].  The method for computing 
and predicting the uncertainty of indications is beyond the scope of this research. 
For example, if an imperfect indication infers fail the technician may decide to 
replace a component.  However, since the indications are imperfect there is a chance 
that one component in the ambiguity group is bad or all components in the ambiguity 
group are good.  Therefore, the probability of completing an unjustified removal is 
related to the ambiguity and the uncertainty of each indication. Most indications have 
a high degree of certainty.  However, as small as the error may be, the probability of 
completing an unjustified removal increases with an increase in indication uncertainty. 
Conversely, imperfect indications can infer pass when one component in the 
ambiguity group is bad.  Misdiagnosis of this type results in leaving bad components 
in the system.  Ifall system indications infer pass, the technician will probably decide 
not to replace any components.  However, unjustified leaves result if no component is 
replaced, when in actuality a bad component is present in the system.  Additionally, 
the normal operation of the system is when all indications infer pass and when all 
components in the system are actually good.  Justified leaves correspond to normal 
system operation, and are defined as leaving good components in the system when 
indications infer pass.  Therefore, justified and unjustified leaves of components are a 
result of indication certainty. 14 
3  Constructing the Diagnostic Model 
The first step in diagnostic analysis is to construct a diagnostic model of the 
system.  The diagnostic model is constructed based on information extracted from the 
FMEA and FTA, component reliability analysis, indication certainty, and prior 
knowledge about the component-indication relationship.  The methodology for 
constructing the diagnostic model based on the system information is shown in Figure 
3.1. 
FMEA 
FTA 
Componcnt-Indication  Component 
Reliability 
Component-Indication 
Failurc Rate Matrix  Joint Probability Matrix 
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 
Figure 3.1. Procedure for constructing a diagnostic model. 
The diagnostic model is constructed by first extracting failure rate and indication 
information from the FMEA and FTA (Figure 3.1A).  The information is arranged in 
graphical and matrix form (see Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3).  The Component-Indication 
Failure Rate Matrix is constructed based on the information extracted from the FMEA 15 
and FT  A.  Next, the component reliability model and exposure times are used to 
compute the probability that each component is good or bad for each failure mode 
(Figure 3.1B).  Finally, using Bayes' formula the joint probabilities of each of the 
mutually exclusive events are computed (Figure 3.1C).  The diagnostic model, when 
presented in matrix form, is denoted as the Component-Indication Joint Probability 
Matrix (Figure 3.1D). 
This section describes the use of the component reliability model, prior 
knowledge about component-indication relationships, Bayes' theory, and truth tables 
to incorporate indication uncertainty into the diagnostic model.  To explain the method 
for constructing the diagnostic model, we will use a simple illustrative example.  The 
illustrative example does not represent an actual system; the failure rates, exposure 
times, and component-indication relationships are hypothetical.  The illustrative 
example is used throughout the construction of the diagnostic model, and again 
presented in the diagnostic analysis methodology and diagnosability metrics sections. 
3.1  Extracting data from the FMEA and FTA 
First, the diagnostic model is constructed utilizing information obtained from the 
failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) and fault tree analysis (FT A).  The FMEA 
contains the functions of the components, the failure modes and failure rates for each 
component, the effects of the failures, and the failure indications associated with each 
component failure.  Additional information about component failures and failure 
indications is obtained from the FT  A.  The FT  A focuses on particular failures and 
failure indication, whereas the FMEA focuses on specific components. The 16 
information extracted from the FMEA and the FfA is combined to embody all failure 
rates and indications associated with the system [Henning 2000]. 
Based on the relationship between failure rates and failure indications, the 
component-indication mapping is constructed.  The system components are placed 
along the top of the figure, and failure indications to which they are mapped are placed 
along the bottom.  The lines connecting the components to the indications represent 
the hypothetical rates of indication occurrences to component failures.  The 
component-indication mapping is presented in graphical format (see Figure 3.2). 
Figure 3.2. Construction of diagnostic model. 
The component failure rate-indication mapping is reorganized into matrix format. 
The components are placed along the top of the matrix and the indications along the 
side of the matrix.  The failure rates of the components are entered into the 
appropriated cells for each component (see Figure 3.3). 17 
l.OxlO-7  Cl  C2  C3  C4  CS 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
2  0  4  0  3 
0  0  0  2  15 
3  2  0  0  0 
0  0  17  0  25 
10  12  0  0  3 
0  0  8  0  0 
Figure 3.3. Component Indication failure rate matrix. 
In the next section we will discuss the computation of component reliability based 
on the failure rates in Figure 3.3. 
3.2  Component Reliability Computation 
Next, a reliability prediction model is utilized in conjunction with the failure rates 
to determine the probability that each component is good and the probability that each 
component is bad.  Reliability is defined as the probability that a system or component 
will perform properly for a specified period of time under a given set of operating 
conditions [Bentley 1993].  The reliability of a component gives rise to the important 
correlation of failure rate.  A bathtub curve is used to describe the failure rates of 
components in the system.  The failure rate is dependent on the time that the 
component is in use.  The initial portion of the bathtub curve is referred to as infant 
mortality.  The failure rates of the components in the infant mortality portion are 
caused by defective equipment and do not accurately represent the actual failure rate 
of the component.  Large failure rates at the beginning of the component use can be 
minimized by a wearin period or strict quality control of the components.  The middle 18 
section of the bathtub curve contains a nearly constant failure rate.  This section is 
referred to as the nonnal life of the component.  The failure rates in the normal life 
portion are generally caused by random failures.  The right hand portion of the bathtub 
curve indicates an increasing failure rate.  This period is referred to as the end-oj-life 
period.  The rapid increase in failure rates is used to determine the life of  the 
component.  The end-oj-life failure period can be avoided by specifying the 
components expected life (see Figure 3.4). 
Nonnal  
Life  
High  ......--~---------~I..,.----I-
Low  ~____~__________________~_________ 
•  .. 
Operating Ufe 
Figure 3.4. Bathtub reliability curve. 
Figure 3.4 represents the general form of failure rates for many different types of 
components and systems.  However, the failure rate curve is substantially different for 
electronic and mechanical equipment.  Failure rate curves for electronic and 
mechanical equipment are presented in Figure 3.5. 19 
ACt)  ,,~______~)  ACt) 
(a) Electronic hardware  (b) Mechanical equipment 
Figure 3.5. Failure rates for different types of systems [Lewis 1996]. 
In this research we will assume a constant failure rate for mechanical components. 
A constant failure rate assumption is often used to describe the reliability of the 
component, with the operating life of the component the period of interest.  The 
constant failure rate assumption is valid because infant mortality can be eliminated 
through strict quality control and a wearin period.  In addition, if mechanical 
components are replaced as they fail, the failure rate of the components is 
approximately constant.  Finally, the time domain of interest can be limited to the 
normal life period, so that it only envelops the constant failure rate portion of the 
operating life. 
The constant failure rate model for continuously operating systems results in an 
exponential probability density function distribution.  The derivation of the probability 
density function (PDF) and the cumulative density function (CDF) for a constant 
failure rate assumption are presented in [Lewis 1996].  Additionally, the component 
reliability is presented in equation 3.1. 20 
R(t) = e-A.t  (3.1) 
Where A is failure rate and t is exposure time. 
Plots of reliability and failure rates as functions of time are shown in figure (see 
Figure 3.6). 
RCt)  ACt) 
L-____________________  t L--------------==----t 
Ca) Reliability  (b) Failure rate 
Figure 3.6. Exponential Distribution [Lewis 1996]. 
The reliability for every failure mode of each component is computed based on 
the failure rate extracted from the FMEA and FT  A and the exposure time of each 
component.  Exposure time is defined as the length of time the component has been in 
use.  For example, if a component is operated continuously for the entire system life, 
the exposure time is the expected life of the system.  If  a component is operated 
intermittently over the life of the component, the exposure time is the total length of 
time the component is operated.  For the illustrative example, hypothetical exposure 
times, for an expected life of 10,000 hours, are given in Table 3.1. 21 
Table 3.1. Exposure times of illustrative example. 
Component  Exposure  lme (h) f  r 
Cl  5000 
C2  3700 
C3  1750 
C4  7200 
C5  10000 
The probabilities that each component is either good or bad are computed for the 
illustrative example based on the failure rates in Figure 3.3 and the exposure times 
from Table 3.1  (see Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2. Reliability computation values. 
- f  lme  (h)  j=good)  j= ComponentId· n  lca Ion  Exposure  r  Pr (C  Pr (C  bad) 
C1,II  5000  0.999  0.001 
C1, I3  - 0.999  0.001 
C1,15  - 0.995  0.005 
C2, I3  3700  0.999  0.001 
C2,15  - 0.996  0.004 
C3,II  1750  0.999  0.001 
C3,14  - 0.997  0.003 
C3,16  - 0.999  0.001 
C4,12  7200  0.999  0.001 
C5,II  10000  0.997  0.003 
C5,12  - 0.985  0.015 
C5,14  - 0.975  0.025 
C5,15  - 0.997  0.003 
In the next section we will discuss how the component reliabilities are utilized in 
conjunction with Bayes formula and known indication certainties to compute the joint 22 
probabilities of all mutually exclusive events in the system and further develop the 
diagnostic model. 
3.3  Incorporating Bayes' Formula into Diagnostic Analysis 
Bayes' theorem is used to determine the truth of an event based on prior 
knowledge and current observation [D' Ambrosio 1999].  Ifan event becomes more or 
less likely to occur based on the occurrence of another event, then the first event is 
said to be a condition of the second event.  The conditional probability of event A 
given that event B has occurred is written as Pr(AIB).  Ifevents A and B are 
independent of each other, then the conditional probability is simply the same as the 
probability of the individual events, that is Pr(BIA) =Pr (B). 
Bayes' theorem is concerned with deducing the probability of B given A from the 
knowledge of Pr(A), Pr(B), and Pr(AIB).  Pr(A) is called the prior probability. 
Pr(AIB) is the posterior probability.  Bayes' theorem is used in diagnostic modeling 
based on inference drawn from prior probabilities of component failure and 
conditional probabilities of component-indication relationships.  Based on the current 
observation of system indications, the joint probabilities are computed. 
Mechanical systems most often are composed of many components and 
indications and their associated interdependencies.  The diagnostic model must 
incorporate each mutually exclusive event for all components and indications in 
mechanicals systems.  For example, more than one component can be mapped to a 
particular indication. The joint probability of an exclusive event must take into 
account all relevant components and indications. 23 
Four mutually exclusive events are developed based on the single failure 
assumptions during the fault diagnosis process.  Anyone component in the system can 
be bad while all other components are good or all components in the system can be 
good. Additionally, system indications can either infer pass or fail (see Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3. Definition of events in the diagnostic truth table. 
Event  Joint Occurrence 
HIT  One Indication=fail, ONE Component=bad 
False Alarm  One Indication=fail, ALL Component = good 
Miss  All Indication=pass, ONE Component=bad 
OK  All Indication=pass, ALL Component=good 
In our system, the HIT event occurs when one component is bad and one 
indication infers fail.  False Alarms occur when one indication infers fail but all 
components are good.  Miss's occur when all indications infer pass but one component 
is bad.  The False Alarm and the Miss events are referred to as Type I and Type II 
errors, and are undesirable in any diagnosis.  Finally, OK's occur when all indications 
infer pass and all components are good (see Figure 3.7). 24 
C1=bad  C1i=bad  C;}=bad  C~bad  CfF-bad  Cl=good  C1i=good  C;}=good  C~good  CfF-good 
Il=fai/ 
12=fai/ 
l3=fai/ 
l4=fail 
l5=fail 
l6=fail 
Il=pass 
12=pass 
13=pass 
l4=pass 
l5=pass 
l6=pass 
HIT 
Pr (One Indication=fail, ONE Component=bad) 
False Alarm 
Pr (One Indication=fail, ALL Component = good) 
Miss 
Pr (All Indication=pass, ONE Component=bad) 
OK 
Pr (All Indication=pass, ALL Component=good) 
Figure 3.7. Diagnostic truth table for fault diagnosis. 
The truth table presented in Figure 3.7, is further simplified according to each 
event defined in Table 3.3.  The False Alarm columns are combined together to 
symbolize the event that one indication infers fail and all components are good. 
Similarly, the Miss rows are combined together to symbolize the event that all 
indications infer pass and any component in the system is bad. The OK events are 
combined into one cell to symbolize the event that all indications infer pass and all 
components are good (see Figure 3.8). 
Cl=bad  C1i=bad  C3=bad  C4=bad  C'!Fbad  All Components=good 
I1=fail  
I2=fail  
I3=fail  
HIT  False Alarm  I4=fail  
I5=fai/  
I6=fail  
~--------------~~---------------+------~~--~ All Indications=pass  Miss  OK 
~----------------------------~------------~ 
Figure 3.8. Combined diagnostic truth table. 25 
The equations used to compute the joint probabilities of all mutually exclusive 
events are derived from Bayes' formula.  The general form of Bayes formula is 
presented for greater than two possible conditions (see Eq. 3.4). 
Pr(AIB,C,D...)= Pr(A,B,C,D... )  (3.4)
Pr(B,C,D... ) 
Equation 3.4 is rearranged to compute the joint probability of an event based on 
prior and conditional probabilities (see Eq. 3.5). 
Pr (A,B, C, D ... ) =Pr (AlB, C, D ... ) x Pr (B, C, D  ... )  (3.5) 
The joint probabilities of each event are computed based on prior probabilities 
and posterior probabilities.  The prior probabilities for the diagnostic process are 
computed from the component reliability model (see section 3.2).  The prior 
probabilities are the probability that the component is either good or bad.  Posterior 
probability is also needed to compute the joint probabilities.  The posterior probability 
is referred to as indication certainty.  Indication certainty is the probability that the 
indications will infer fail when one component mapped to it is bad or the probability 
that the indication will infer pass when all components mapped to it are good (see 
Table 3.4). 26 
Table 3.4. Indi~ation certainty, Posterior Probability. 
Pr(Indication =faill One Com  onent=bad) 
Pr(Indication =faill All Com onents=good) 
Indication certainty must be known to compute the joint probability of events in 
the diagnostic process to ultimately construct the diagnostic model.  However, during 
the conceptual stages of design, these values may not always be known.  The 
uncertainty of the indications can be estimated for conceptual designs based on similar 
systems or can be approximated based prior design experience.  As more knowledge is 
gained about the system, the indication uncertainty values can be refined. 
The equations used for computing the joint probabilities of all mutually exclusive 
events in the system are presented.  The nomenclature presented in Table 3.5 is used in 
the joint probability equations. 
Table 3.5. Nomenclature used in joint probability equations. 
Nomenclature  Definition 
B  Bad 
C  Component 
F  Fail 
G  Good 
I  Indication 
i  ith Component 
j  jth Indication 
P  Pass 27 
HIT Joint Probability: 
The HIT joint probability is computed for all component-indication events.  Each 
time a component is bad and an indication infers fail is a mutually exclusive event for 
all indications and components.  The joint probability of each of these mutually 
exclusive events cannot be combined.  Equation 3.6 computes the HIT joint 
probabilities. 
Pr(lj =F,C1=B,···,Cj =G)=Pr(lj =FIC1=B,···,Cj=G)xPr(CI =B,···,Cj =G)  (3.6) 
The Pr(C1=B, ..., Cj=G) is the probability of independent events occurring at the 
same time, and can therefore be modified into the product of the probabilities of each 
event occurring.  The joint probability for each hit event is computed using the 
appropriate component reliability data.  For example, only those components that are 
mapped to the indication are used in the computation of the joint probability. 
Pr(lj = F,CI  = B,···,Cj  = G) = Pr(Ij  = F I OneC = B)xPr(CI  = B)x ",xPr(Cj  = G)  (3.7) 
False Alarm Joint Probability: 
The False Alarm joint probability is computed for each system indication 
separately.  For example, in the illustrative example problem, six false alarm joint 
probabilities are computed corresponding to the six independent system indications. 
The False Alarm assumes every component mapped to a single indication is good. 
Equation 3.8 computes the False Alarm joint probabilities for all indications. 28 
Pr(Ij  =F,C1 =G,···,Ci  =G)=Pr(Ij  =FIC1 =G,···,Ci  =G)XPr(CI =G,···,Ci =G)  (3.8) 
The conditional probabilities in equation 3.8 are replaced with the known 
indication uncertainties to yield equation 3.9. 
Pr(Ij  =F,C1 =G,···,ci =G)=Pr(Ij  =FIAllC's=G)xPr(CI =G)x···xPr(Ci  =G)  (3.9) 
Miss Joint Probability: 
The Miss joint probability is computed for each component in the system.  The 
Miss event occurs when one component is bad and all indications mapped to the 
component infer pass.  The Miss joint probability is computed assuming that only one 
component has failed in any of the failure modes and that all indications mapped to the 
component, regardless of failure mode infer pass.  In the illustrative example, five 
Miss joint probability values are computed, corresponding to the five components in 
the system.  Equation 3.10 computes the Miss joint probability values. 
Pr(ll = p, ...,1j = P,c1 = B) = Pr(II = PI Cll = B)x  Pr(Cll = B)...OR 
(3.10)
...  Pr(Ij  = P I c 1j  = B)xPr(C1j  = B) 
Since the indications are collectively exhaustive, the probabilities in Eq. 3.10 can 
be summed for each component: 29 
Pr(l1  = P,···,Ij = P,C1 = B) = Pr(I1  = P I Cl1 = B)x Pr(Cl1 = B) ...+ 
(3.11) ... Pr(lj = P I  C1j  = B)x Pr(C1j  = B) 
The certainties for all indications in the system are substituted into Eq. 3.11 to 
yield Eq. 3.12. 
Pr(l1  =P, ... ,Ij =P,C1 =B)=Pr(I1 =PIOneC=B)xPr(Cl1 =B)  ...+ 
(3.12) 
... Pr(lj =PIOneC=B)xPr(C1j  =B) 
OK Joint Probability: 
The OK joint probability is computed based on the previously computed joint 
probabilities.  The total probability of all mutually exclusive events must sum to 1.0 to 
represent a collectively exhaustive system analysis.  The joint probability of the OK 
event is computed by subtracting the total sum of the HIT, False Alarm, and Miss 
probabilities from unity.  The OK event assumes all components are good and all 
indications infer pass, thereby resulting in a single value for the system.  Equation 
3.13 computes the OKjoint probability for the system. 
n,m  m  n 
Pr(AllI's=P,AllC's=G)=l.O-I)HIT Ci,IJ-I~alseAlannIJ-I  [Miss cd  (3.13) 
i,j=l  j=1  i=l 
Equations 3.7, 3.9, 3.12, and 3.13 are used to compute the joint probability of all 
mutually exclusive events associated with mechanical fault diagnosis.  The equations 30 
are used in conjunction with the component reliability and indication uncertainty (see 
Table 3.2 and Table 3.6). 
Table 3.6. Indication uncertainty for illustrative example. 
Pr (I1=fail 
Pr (I1=fail 
Anyone Component = fail) 
All Component = good) 
99.99% 
0.01% 
Pr (12=fail 
Pr (12=fail 
Anyone Component = fail) 
All Component = good) 
99.99% 
0.01% 
Pr (I3=fail 
Pr (I3=fail 
Anyone Component = fail) 
All Component = good) 
99.99% 
0.01% 
Pr (14=fail 
Pr (14=fail 
Anyone Component = fail) 
All Component = good) 
99.99% 
0.01% 
Pr (15=fail 
Pr (15=fail 
Anyone Component = fail) 
All Component = good) 
99.99% 
0.01% 
Pr (16=fail 
Pr (16=fail 
Anyone Component = fail) 
All Component = good) 
99.99% 
0.01% 
3.4  Formation of Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix, PR 
The Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix, denoted by PR, is composed 
of the joint probabilities for all events in the system.  Based on the data and equations 
presented in the previous section, the joint probabilities are computed are arranged in 
matrix form. The cells in the Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix that have 
a value of zero indicate that the particular indication is not directly related to the state 
of the corresponding component.  For example, the failure of component one (C1) is 
not mapped directly to indication two (12). Therefore the probability that C1 is bad 
and 12 infers fail is negligible or never occurs.  Additionally, the probabilities of the 31 
indications are computed by summing each of the rows in the matrix.  The 
probabilities of the components are computed by summing each of the columns in the 
matrix (see Figure 3.9). 
Indication 
Cl  C2  C3  C4  CS  All Good  Prob 
11  0.000996  0.000000  0.000697  0.000000  0.002990  0.000100  0.0048 
12  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.001417  0.014865  0.000098  0.0164 
13  0.001498  0.000739  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000100  0.0023 
14  0.000000  0.000000  0.002897  0.000000  0.024614  0.000097  0.0276 
15  0.004950  0.004394  0.000000  0.000000  0.002967  0.000099  0.0124 
16  0.000000  0.000000  0.001399  0.000000  0.000000  0.000100  0.0015 
All Pass  0.000001  0.000001  0.000001  0.000000  0.000005  0.934977  0.9350 
CompProb  0.0074  0.0051  0.0050  0.0014  0.0454  0.9356 
Figure 3.9. Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix. 
In the next section, we will discuss how the Component-Indication Joint 
Probability Matrix is utilized to complete diagnostic analysis. 32 
4  Diagnosability Analysis 
In order to complete diagnostic analysis, as illustrated in Figure 1.1, two 
additional matrices are formed based on the Component-Indication Joint Probability 
Matrix.  First, the Replacement Matrix is constructed by applying replacement 
criterion to the Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix.  Next, the 
Replacement Probability Matrix is computed by multiplying the transpose of the 
Replacement Matrix by the Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix.  Finally, 
diagnosability metrics are extracted from the Replacement Probability Matrix. 
The hypothetical example problem is again utilized to illustrate and verify the 
diagnostic analysis methodologies.  An indication certainty of 99.99 percent is used 
for the analysis. 
4.1  Replacement Matrix, R 
The replacement matrix, denoted by R, is a binary matrix.  The replacement 
criterion determines which component is replaced for each indication in the system. 
The replacement criterion is determined before the diagnostic analysis begins.  The 
criterion could be component cost, replacement time, probability of occurrence, or a 
combination of these factors.  For the illustrative example, the chosen replacement 
criterion is probability of occurrence. 33 
To form the replacement matrix, each row (indication) of the Component-
Indication Joint Probability Matrix is examined individually.  For the illustrative 
example, a one is entered in the cell of the component with the largest probability of 
occurrence for each indication.  Zeroes are entered into the remaining cells of each 
row.  This process is repeated for all indications.  Figure 4.1 is the replacement matrix 
for the illustration example. 
Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5  All Good 
11  0  0  0  0  1  0 
12  0  0  0  0  1  0 
13  1  0  0  0  0  0 
14  0  0  0  0  1  0 
15  1  0  0  0  0  0 
16  0  0  1  0  0  0 
All Pass  0  0  0  0  0  1 
Figure 4.1. Replacement Matrix, R. 
The newly formed Replacement Matrix is used in conjunction with the 
Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix in the next section to construct the 
Replacement Probability Matrix. 
4.2  Computation of the Replacement Probability Matrix, RpR 
The Replacement Probability Matrix, denoted by RpR, is computed by multiplying 
the transpose of the Replacement Matrix by the Component-Indication Joint 
Probability Matrix (see Eq. 4.1). 34 
(4.1)  
The Replacement Probability Matrix for the illustrative example is presented in 
Figure 4.2. 
Failed  ~ 
Replaced  J- Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5  All Good 
Cl  0.00645  0.00513  0.00000  0.00000  0.00297  0.00020 
C2  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
C3  0.00000  0.00000  0.00140  0.00000  0.00000  0.00010 
C4  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
C5  0.00100  0.00000  0.00359  0.00142  0.04247  0.00030 
None replaced  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.93498 
Pr (Just removal)  0.00645  0.00000  0.00140  0.00000  0.04247  0.05032 
Pr(Unjust removal)  0.00100  0.00513  0.00359  0.00142  0.00297  0.00059  0.01470 
Pr(Just leave)  0.93498 
Pr(Unjust leave)  0.00001 
Pr(Just Action)  0.00645  0.00000  0.00140  0.00000  0.04247  0.93498  0.98529 
Figure 4.2. Replacement Probability Matrix, RpR• 
The Replacement Probability Matrix is a square matrix.  The columns represent 
the actual condition of each component in the system and the rows represent the action 
completed on each component in the system.  An action is defined as either replacing 
or leaving a component in the system.  The values along the diagonal represent the 
justified action probabilities.  The values in the off-diagonals represent the unjustified 
action probabilities.  For example, the justified probability that all components are 
good and none are replaced is 0.93498. 35 
The diagnosability metrics are computed based on the unjustified and justified 
probabilities extracted from the Replacement Probability Matrix.  The metrics are 
developed and discussed in the next section. 
4.3  Distinguishability Metrics 
Distinguishability (D) is the metric that measures the efficiency of fault isolation 
after completion of the observation phase.  As presented in Henning [2000], 
distinguishability is defined as the probability of correctly replacing a bad component 
given an indication infers fail. In this research the definition of distinguishability is 
expanded to include all possible courses of action during the diagnostic process.  It is 
possible for components to either be replaced or left in the system during the fault 
diagnosis process.  As previously defined, a justified action is replacing those 
components that are bad and leaving those components that are good in the system. 
As the distinguishability of the system increases, the probability of completing a 
justified action is maximized.  By maximizing the chance of completing justified 
actions, and thereby minimizing the completion of unjustified actions during the 
diagnostic process, cost and time are minimized.  The distinguishability metric is 
presented in several forms.  Distinguishability metrics are computed to the system, 
indication, and component level (Dsys, D1ND, DLRu).  Additionally, the system level 
distinguishability value comes in many forms.  System distinguishability is computed 
for all actions and for replacements completed during the diagnostic process.  Table 
4.1 presents the distinguishability metrics definitions. 36 
Table 4.1. Definitions of distinguishability metrics. 
M etnc  P  babTt  f ro  lItyo : 
DIND  .  Justified removal, givenjth failure indication 
DLRU '  Justified removal, given ith component failed 
D SYS  Justified removal, given some failure indication (or some component failed). 
n  m 
Computed as:  LPr(Just.removaICJ or LPr(JustremovalIj ) 
i=!  j=! 
The metric value is just for the replaced components 
D SYS, TOTAL  Computed as: 
n LPr(Just. removal CJ + Pr(Just.leaveCi ) 
i=! 
or 
m 
LPr(Just.removalIj ) + Pr(Just.1eaveIj ) 
j=! 
Computed for both justified removals and justified "leaves" 
D SYS, JUST REMOVAL  Computed as: 
n L Pr(Just.Re moval Ci ) 
i=! 
n  n 
LPr(Just.RemovaICi)+ LPr(Unjust.RemovaICJ 
i=!  i=! 
The system distinguishability [Dsys], defined as probability of completing 
justified removals, is computed by summing the probability of completing a justified 
removal for all components in the system.  The total distinguishability of the system 
[Dsys,TOTAd, defined as probability of completing all justified actions during the 
diagnostic process, is computed by summing the probability of all justified actions 
from the Replacement Probability Matrix.  The distinguishability of the system 
normalized for justified removals [Dsys,JUSTREMOVAd is computed for justified 
removals of system components (see Figure 4.2). 37 
In addition to diagnostic analysis of entire systems, it is important to isolate 
problems associated with specific components or indications in the architecture of the 
system.  In order to locate and alleviate diagnosability problems with the overall 
mechanical system, the system must be analyzed to an indication and/or component 
level.  The component distinguishability is extracted from each column in the 
Replacement Probability Matrix. For example, the probability of completing a 
justified removal of component one (Cl) is 0.00645. 
The indication distinguishability is computed by multiplying the Component-
Indication Joint Probability [PRJ by the Replacement Matrix [R].  The indication 
distinguishability [DIND]  is extracted from each row of the matrix (see Figure 4.3). 
II  0.000996  0.0  0.000697  0.0  0.002990  0.000100 
12  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.001417  0.014865  0.000098 
13  0.001498  0.000739  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.000100 
14  0.0  0.0  0.002897  0.0  0.024614  0.000097 
15  0.004950  0.004394  0.0  0.0  0.002967  0.000099 
16  0.0  0.0  0.001399  0.0  0.0  0.000100 
AllGood  0.000001  0.000001  0.000001  0.0  0.000005  0.934977 
. 
0  0  0  0  1  0  0.00299 
0  0  0  0  1  0  0.01487 
1  0  0  0  0  0  0.00150 
0  0  0  0  1  o = 0.02461 
1  0  0  0  0  0  0.00495 
0  0  1  0  0  0  0.00140 
0  0  o ·0  0  1  0.93498 
Figure 4.3. Computation of indication distinguishability metrics. 
In the next section, the diagnosability analysis is completed for varied indication 
certainty and for hypothetical design changes of the system architecture of the 
illustration example. 38 
5  Results 
The distinguishability analysis results for the illustrative example problem are 
presented.  The distinguishability of the system, D sys,JUST REMOVAL, decreases from 
0.781 when the indications are perfect (100% certain), to a minimum value of 0.6212 
when the all indications are 99 percent certain.  Additionally, the probability of 
completing a justified action after the observation phase, DSYS,TOTAL, decreases from 
0.98589 for perfect indications to 0.95509 for indications that have a certainty of 99 
percent (see Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1. Distinguishability analysis for various indication certainties. 
Pr (I=faill One C=fail)  Pr (I=faill All C=good)  Dsys,TOTAL  Dsys,JUST REMOVAL 
100.00%  0.00%  0.98589  0.78103 
99.999%  0.001%  0.98583  0.78031 
99.99%  0.01%  0.98529  0.77390 
99.00%  1.00%  0.95509  0.62123 
The component distinguishability [DLRu] values are summarized in Table 5.2. 39 
Table 5.2. Component distinguishability for illustrative example. 
Component  DLRU 
C1  0.00645 
C2  0.00000 
C3  0.00140 
C4  0.00000 
C5  0.04247 
All Good  0.93498 
The indication distinguishability [DIND]  values are summarized in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3. Indication Distinguishability metrics. 
Indication  DIND 
11  0.00299 
12  0.01487 
I3  0.00150 
14  0.02461 
15  0.00495 
16  0.00140 
All pass  0.93498 
In addition to completing diagnostic analysis on the illustrative example for 
varied indication certainties, hypothetical design changes were implemented to 
analyze how distinguishability is affected for changes in system architecture.  The 
illustrative system is modified into three hypothetical alternative designs and 
diagnostic analysis is completed.  The first alternative system, maps all component 
failure rates to one indication.  The second alternative system maps the failure rates of 
all components to separate indications, resulting in 13 indications.  Finally, the third 40 
alternative design uses the same number of indications, as in the original system. 
However, the component-indication mapping is altered (see Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4. Alternative designs of illustrative example. 
Alternative 
D  .  D·  t· eSlgns  eSCrIpllOn 
- Original system, illustrative example system 
1  All component failures mapped to one indication 
2  All component failures mapped to different indications, 13 indications 
3  System is modified from System 1, 6 failure indications 
The distinguishability results of the original illustrative example and the three 
alternative designs are summarized in Table 5.5.  A uniform indication uncertainty of 
99.99 percent is assumed.  The worksheets for completing the diagnostic analysis are 
included in Appendix A. 
Table 5.5. Distinguishability results for alternative designs. 
Alternative 
D' eSlgn #  Pr (I=fal '1 I C = ba d)  Pr (I=fal '11 C = good)  DSYS  JUST REMOVAL  DSYS  TOTAL 
- 99.99%  0.01%  0.98529  0.77390 
1  99.99%  0.01%  0.98138  0.70869 
2  99.99%  0.01%  0.99870  0.98041 
3  99.99%  0.01%  0.99059  0.85581 
The architecture of the system clearl y affects the distinguishability of the system. 
For example, the maximum distinguishability (Dsys, JUST REMOVALS) results when each 41 
component failure is mapped to a separate indication.  Conversely, the minimum 
distinguishability results when all component failures are mapped to one indication. 
System three uses the same number of indications as in the original system. 
However, the component failures are mapped to different indications, essentially 
reducing the average ambiguity group size for each indication.  A decrease in the 
average ambiguity group size results in an increase in system distinguishability (see 
Table 5.6). 
Table 5.6. Average size of ambiguity group for hypothetical design alternatives. 
Alternative  Average size of 
D·  amb· IgUlly group  eSI~n #  ·t 
- 2.16  
1  5  
2  1  
3  1.83  
The diagnostic analysis is applied to an icemaker validation system in the next 
section. 42 
6  Validation Example: Icemaker 
A common home ice maker is used for validation of the diagnostic modeling 
methods and distinguishability metrics.  The icemaker example was originally used by 
[Eubanks 1997] to illustrate an advance FMEA method for use during conceptual 
design.  This same example was used by [Henning 2000] for development of 
diagnostic analysis methodologies.  The icemaker provides an example of a physically 
embodied system of moderate complexity. 
6.1  Icemaker Diagnostic Model 
The information needed to complete the diagnostic model of the ice maker 
example is presented.  Indication certainty and exposure times for each component are 
estimated for constructing the diagnostic model.  Additionally, the indications are 
assumed to have a uniform certainty of 99 percent (see Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1. Icemaker indication certainty. 
fr (Any indication=faill Anyone Component = fail)  99% 
:Pr (Any Indication=fail I All Components = good)  1% 
Examples of the exposure times for icemaker components are given in Table 6.2. 43 
Table 6.2. Component exposure times. 
IExpected life of icemaker  15 years 
~cemaker  cycles/day  3 
Component  Exposure Time (hrs) Exposure Time Assumptions 
~1: Feeler arm  5475  (20 min/cycle) 
C2: Switch Linkage  2737.5  (10 min/cycle) 
C3: Switch  2737.5  (10 min/cycle) 
C4: Mold  32850  (2 hours/cycle 
C5: Freezer  131400  (Life of freezer) 
C6: Water Delivery  4106.25  (15 min/cycle) 
C7: Mold Heater  1095  (4 min/cycle) 
C8: Ice Harvester  547.5  (2 min/cycle) 
C9: Ice Timer  32850  (25% of life of refrigerator) 
E: External Factor  657  (Intermittent, happen .5% over lifetime) 
Failure indications for the ice  maker example originally derived in [Henning 2000] are 
given in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.3. Failure indications [Henning 2000]. 
il  No ice in the bucket 
i2  Ice overflowing 
i3  Low ice level in the bucket 
i4  Ice layer in bucket and/or fused ice cubes 
i5  No water in the mold (not observable) 
i6  Small or irregular ice cubes 
i7  Ice stuck in the mold (not observable) 
i8  Icemaker not running 
i9  Feeler arm in the bucket 
ilO  Large or partially liquid ice cubes 44 
Indication sets are formed from the individual indications.  The indication sets are 
used to develop the component-indication mapping (see Table 6.4). 
Table 6.4. Indication sets [Henning 2000]. 
11  No ice + ice layer  (il + i4) 
12  No ice  (il) 
13  Ice overflow  (i2) 
14  Low ice level  (i3) 
IS  Small ice size + ice layer  (i6 + i4) 
16  No ice + feeler arm in bucket  (il +i9) 
17  Small ice size  (i6) 
The relationship between components and indication in the icemaker system are 
shown in Table 6.S. 
Table 6.5. Component-indication set relationships [Henning 2000]. 
Component  I  d·  Ica Ion S  ts  n  f  e 
C1: Feeler Arm  1216 
C2: Switch Linkage  121314 
C3: Switch  1213 
C4: Mold  11  15 
CS: Freezer  11  12 
C6: Water Delivery  12 IS 
C7: Mold Heater  11  12 
C8: Ice Harvest  11  12 
C9: Ice Timer  12 IS 
E: External Factor  IS 17 
Using Table 6.1, Table 6.2, Table 6.3, Table 6.4, Table 6.S, and the FMEA, a 
diagnostic model for the icemaker is constructed (see Figure 6.1). 45 
All 
Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5  C6  C7  C8  C9  E  Good 
11  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003  0.120  0.000  0.007  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.009 
12  0.000  0.014  0.009  0.000  0.l91  0.007  0.001  0.000  0.089  0.000  0.006 
13  0.000  0.029  0.013  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.010 
14  0.000  0.019  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.010 
15  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.024  0.000  0.017  0.000  0.000  0.045  0.002  0.009 
16  0.00 1  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.010 
17  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.Ql0  0.010 
All Pass  0.000  0.00 1  0.000  0.000  0.004  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.327 
Figure 6.1. Icemaker Component-Indication Joint Probability Matrix. 
In the next section we will complete the diagnosability analysis based on the 
model constructed of the icemaker system. 
6.2  Icemaker Diagnostic Analysis 
Table 6.6 summarizes the distinguishability values of the icemaker.  The 
worksheets for calculating the ice  maker distinguishability metrics are presented in 
Appendix D. 
Table 6.6. Icemaker diagnosability analysis for imperfect indications. 
P  (I= al  f  ·1 I 0 ne C= al  ·1)  P  (I= al  f  ·1 I All C =good)  DSYS  TOTAL  r  f  r  DSYS  JUST REMOVAL 
100.00 %  0.00%  0.8109  0.6893 
99.999 %  0.001 %  0.8108  0.6892 
99.99 %  0.01 %  0.8102  0.6886 
99.00 %  1.00 %  0.7514  0.6368 
The distinguishability of the icemaker system decreases as indication uncertainty 
is increased.  For example, the probability of correctly replacing a bad component in 46 
the system decreases from a probability of 0.6893 for perfect indication to 0.6368 for 
indications that are 99 percent certain. 
Table 6.7 and Table 6.9 summarize the distinguishability results for individual 
indications and components in the ice maker system.  Component and indication 
results are computed based on 99 percent indication certainty. 
Table 6.7. Icemaker indication distinguishability. 
nIND  
I  d·  n  f  Pr (Just)  r (U·  lca Ion  P  DJUSt) 
11  0.1204  0.0190 
12  0.1910  0.1271 
I3  0.0290  0.0226 
14  0.0188  0.0098 
15  0.0454  0.0521 
16  0.0100  0.0011 
17  0.0099  0.0097 
All pass  0.3269  0.0071 
Indication two (12), indication three (I3), and indication seven (17) contain values 
of unjustified removals close to the probability of completing a justified removal.  For 
Indication five (15), the probability of completing an unjustified removal is greater 
than completing a justified removal.  In order to increase the distinguishability of the 
system, these indications should be examined.  Upon further investigation of the 
Component-Indication mapping it is determined the indications with large ambiguity 
groups are the main areas of concern with distinguishability of the system (see Table 47 
6.8).  For example, indication two (12) has an ambiguity group of eight components 
and a high probability of completing an unjustified removal. 
Table 6.8. Number of components in ambiguity group. 
No. of components in  
I  d·  f  b·  ·t  n  Ica Ion  am 19uuy group 
11  4 
12  8 
13  2 
14  I 
15  4 
16  1 
17  1 
In order to improve the distinguishability of the system, the architecture should be 
changed to decrease the size of the ambiguity groups for each indication.  This can be 
achieved by either increasing the number of indications in the system or by altering 
the component-indication mapping of the current system. 
The distinguishability results of icemaker components enable specific diagnostic 
problems to be located (see Table 6.9). 48 
Table 6.9. Icemaker component distinguishability. 
DLRU 
component  Pr (Just removaI)  Pr (U' nJust removaI)  Pr (U' nJust Ieave) 
C1: Feeler Arm  0.0000  0.0000  0.0436 
C2: Switch Linkage  0.0478  0.0141  0.0007 
C3: Switch  0.0000  0.0218  0.0003 
C4: Mold  0.0000  0.0268  0.0003 
C5: Freezer  0.3114  0.0000  0.0035 
C6: Water Delivery  0.0000  0.0233  0.0003 
C7: Mold Heater  0.0000  0.0080  0.0001 
C8: Ice harvesting  0.0000  0.0013  0.0000 
C9: Ice timer  0.0454  0.0892  0.0017 
E: External factors  0.0000  0.0024  0.0098 
The probability of completing an unjustified removal can be significantly 
increased based on problems associated with only a few components in the system. 
Conversely, if these problems are alleviated, the system distinguishability can be 
greatly improved.  For example, component three (C3), component four (C4) and 
component six (C6) are subject to a relatively high probability of unjustified removals. 
Additionally, component nine (C9) has the greatest chance of being removed unjustly. 
To increase the distinguishability of the system, the problems with these specific 
components should be addressed.  To alleviate the diagnostic problems, the exposure 
time of the components can be reduced, the reliability of the components can be 
increased, or the architecture of the system can be altered. 49 
7  Summary and Conclusions 
The objective in this research was to create a diagnostic model that incorporated 
uncertainty caused from imperfect indications.  Bayes' formula is used to construct an 
accurate diagnostic model of a physically embodied system based on information 
extracted from the FMEA, FfA, component reliability, and known indication 
uncertainty. 
A new method for computing the diagnosability of systems is presented.  The 
method uses a series of matrices that are mathematically manipulated to form the 
Replacement Probability Matrix.  This matrix represents the joint probabilities of 
mutually exclusive diagnostic events.  The distinguishability metrics are extracted 
from the Replacement Probability Matrix.  Distinguishability metrics are developed 
for analysis to the system, component, and indication levels.  The methodologies have 
been applied to an illustrative example problem and the icemaker system initially 
described in Eubanks [1997].  The methodology can be used to analyze systems at the 
conceptual stages of design or to improve systems already in use.  Areas of concern in 
the architecture of the system can be identified and addressed to eliminate problems 
with fault isolation that may be encountered.  The metrics have a mathematical 
foundation and produce an objective evaluation, thereby minimizing subjective 
analysis of conceptual designs. 
Additionally, the methodologies are evolutionary.  During the initial stages of 
design, concise and comprehensive information may not be readily available to 50 
completely analyze the system.  However, as the design evolves and abstractness is 
reduced, the diagnostic analysis is based on more refined information, thereby 
resulting in greater accuracy. 
Diagnostic analysis results of the illustrative example and the icemaker show that 
an increase in indication uncertainty has a detrimental effect on the completion of 
justified actions during the diagnostic process. As indication uncertainty is increased, 
the probability of completing an unjustified removal or unjustified leave also 
increases.  In addition, the architecture of the system also affects the system 
diagnosability.  As the architecture of the system is altered to decrease the average size 
of the ambiguity group, the diagnosability of the system increases. 51 
8  Future Work 
There is opportunity for future work in several areas.  Utility theory and Bayesian 
networks should be utilized to further research the optimal replacement criterion to 
maximize the knowledge gained about the state of the components in the system and 
minimize the costs associated with the fault diagnosis.  In addition to the observation 
phase, an additional phase of the diagnostic process involving the completion of 
diagnostic tests must be further researched.  Diagnostic testing provides additional 
knowledge about the state of the components in the system, and thereby increases the 
probability of replacing a component that has caused the failure indication to occur. 
Similar methodologies and metrics related to the test phase should be further 
researched and developed.  With the inclusion of the diagnostic testing phases, utility 
theory and Bayesian networks should be utilized to predict the optimal testing order of 
components.  The allocation of maintenance time is another area of research in the 
diagnosis of mechanical systems that should be studied.  Decision networks and utility 
theory should be applied to allocate maintenance time between the diagnostic testing 
tasks, component access tasks, and component replace/repair tasks. 
Additionally, the use of the methodologies, not only as a design prediction tool, 
but also as a maintenance and service tool that can aid technicians during fault 
isolation procedures should be explored.  Finally, the long-term goal is the creation of 
a computer program for diagnostic analysis using the developed methodologies as the 
underlying mathematics. 52 
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Appendices 55 
Appendix A. Distinguishability Analysis of Alternative System Designs 56 
The worksheets for completing the diagnostic analysis of the illustrative example 
are presented.  The included analysis assumes a uniform indication certainty of 99.99 
percent.  Additionally, the exposure times of the components remain the same for all 
of the alternative designs (see Table A.l). 
Table A.t. Component exposure times. 
Component  Exposure fIme (b) r 
Cl  5000 
C2  3700 
C3  1750 
C4  7200 
C5  10000 57 
Alternative Design 1, One Failure Indication: 
Table A.2. Failure rate matrix, Alternative Design 1. 
1.0xlO-7  Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5 
15  14  29  2  46 11 
Table A.3. Component reliability computation, Alternative Design 1. 
Component I  di  n  f  Exposure T"  r  r  j=good)  r  a - ca Ion  Ime (h)  P  (C  P  (Cj=  b  d) 
C1, II  5000  0.993  0.007 
C2, II  3700  0.995  0.005 
C3, II  1750  0.995  0.005 
C4, II  7200  0.999  0.001 
C5, II  10000  0.955  0.045 
Table A.4. Component-indication joint probability matrix, Alternative Design 1. 
Indication 
Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5  All Good  Prob. 
11  0.0071  0.0049  0.0048  0.0013  0.0441  0.0001  0.0622 
All Pass  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.9373  0.9378 
CompProb  0.0072  0.0050  0.0049  0.0014  0.0442  0.9374  1.00oQ 58 
Table A.S. Replacement matrix, Alternative Design 1.  
Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5  All Good  
11  o  o  o  o  o 
All Pass  o  o  o  o  o 
Table A.6. Replacement probability matrix, Alternative Design 1. 
Replaced J, 
Cl 
C2 
C3 
C4 
C5 
None replaced 
Pr(Just removal) 
Pr(Unjust removal) 
Pr(Just leave) 
Pr(Unjust leave) 
Pr(Just Action) 
Failed  ~  
Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5  All Good  
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
0.00705  0.00487  0.00477  0.00135  0.04410  0.00009 
0.00010  0.00010  0.00010  0.00010  0.00010  0.93728 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.04410  0.04410 
0.00705  0.00487  0.00477  0.00135  0.00000  0.00009  0.01813 
0.93728 
0.00049 
0.00000  0.00000  0.04410  0.93728  0.98138 59 
11 
Alternative Design 2,13 Failure Indications: 
Table A.7. Failure rate matrix, Alternative Design 2. 
10.7 hour'!  C1  C2  C3  C4  CS 
2  0  0  0  0  
12   0  0  4  0  0  
13   0  0  0  0  3  
14   0  0  0  2  0  
15   0  0  0  0  15  
16   3  0  0  0  0  
17   0  2  0  0  0  
18   0  0  17  0  0  
19   0  0  0  0  25  
110   10  0  0  0  0  
III   0  12  0  0  0  
112   0  0  0  0  3  
113   0  0  8  0  0 
Table A.S. Component reliability computation, Alternative Design 2. 
C  I  Icabon  Exposure T"Ime  r  P(C;=200d)  P  j= b  d)  omponent- n d'  (h)  r  r (C  a 
CI,11  5000  0.999  0.001 
C1,16  - 0.999  0.001 
CI,110  - 0.995  0.005 
C2, I7  3700  0.999  0.001 
C2,111  - 0.996  0.004 
C3,12  1750  0.999  0.001 
C3,18  - 0.997  0.003 
C3,113  - 0.999  0.001 
C4,14  7200  0.999  0.001 
C5,I3  10000  0.997  0.003 
C5,15  - 0.985  0.015 
C5,19  - 0.975  0.025 
C5,112  - 0.997  0.003 60 
Table A.9. Component.  indication joint probability matrix, Alternative Design 2. 
Indication 
C1  C2  C3  C4  C5  All Good  Prob 
11   0.0010  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0011 
12   0.0000  0.0000  0.0007  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0008 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0030  0.0001 13   0.0031 
14   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0014  0.0000  0.0001  0.0015 
15   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0149  0.0001  0.0150 
16   0.0015  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0016 
17   0.0000  0.0007  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0008 
18   0.0000  0.0000  0.0030  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0031 
19   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0247  0.0001  0.0248 
110   0.0050  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0051 
III   0.0000  0.0044  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0045 
112   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0030  0.0001  0.0031 
113   0.0000  0.0000  0.0014  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0015 
All Pass  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.9340  0.9340 
CompProb  0.0075  0.0052  0.0051  0.0014  0.0456  0.9353  1.0QQQ 
Table A.tO. Replacement matrix, Alternative Design 2. 
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
110  
III  
112  
113  
All Pass  
C1 
1  
0  
0  
0  
0  
1  
0  
0  
0  
1  
0  
0  
0  
0  
C2 
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
1  
0  
0  
0  
1  
0  
0  
0  
C3 
0  
1  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
1  
0  
0  
0  
0  
1  
0  
C4 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
C5 
0 
0 
1  
0  
1  
0  
0  
0  
1  
0  
0  
1  
0  
0  
All Good  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
0  
1  61 
Table A.H. Replacement probability matrix, Alternative Design 2. 
Failed  ~ 
Replaced  J..  Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5  All Good 
Cl  0.00749  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00030 
C2  0.00000  0.00517  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00020 
C3  0.00000  0.00000  0.00507  0.00000  0.00000  0.00030 
C4  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00144  0.00000  0.00010 
C5  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.04556  0.00040 
None replaced  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.93397 
Pr(Just removal)  0.00507  0.06473 
Pr(Unjust  0.00129 
Pr(Just leave)  0.93397 
Pr(Unjust leave)  0.00001 
Pr(Just Action)  0.00749  0.00517  0.00507  0.00144  0.04556  0.93397  0.99870 62 
Alternative Design 3, Original system failure rate-indication mapping modified: 
Table A.12. Failure rate matrix, Alternative Design 4.  
1.0xlO-7  Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5  
It 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
12 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
12 
0 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
25 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
15 
0 
25 
3 
0 
Table A.13. Component reliability computation, Alternative Design 4. 
Component-
IndicafIOn  Exposure  Ime  r  pr(Cj=good)  Pr (Cj=  a T"  (h )  b  d) 
C1,II  5000  0.994  0.006 
C1, I3  5000  0.999  0.001 
C2, I3  3700  0.999  0.001 
C2,15  3700  0.996  0.004 
C3,II  1750  0.999  0.001 
C3,16  1750  0.996  0.004 
C4,12  7200  0.999  0.001 
C5,11  10000  0.997  0.003 
C5,12  10000  0.985  0.015 
C5,14  10000  0.975  0.025 
C5,15  10000  0.997  0.003 63 
Table A.14. Component-indication joint probability matrix, Alternative Design 4. 
Indication 
Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5  All Good  Prob 
11  0.0060  0.0000  0.0007  0.0000  0.0030 
12  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0014  0.0149 
13  0.0015  0.0007  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
14  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0247 
15  0.0000  0.0044  0.0000  0.0000  0.0030 
16  0.0000  0.0000  0.0044  0.0000  0.0000 
All Pass  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.9348 
0.0097 
0.0164 
0.0023 
0.0248 
0.0075 
0.0045 
0.9348 
Comp Prob  0.0075  0.0052  0.0051  0.0014  0.0455  0.9354  1.0~ 
Table A.IS. Replacement matrix, Alternative Design 4. 
Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5  All Good 
11  1  0  0  0  0  0 
12  0  0  0  0  1  0 
13  1  0  0  0  0  0 
14  0  0  0  0  1  0 
15  0  1  0  0  0  0 
16  0  0  1  0  0  0 
All Pass  0  0  0  0  0 64 
Table A.16. Replacement probability matrix, Alternative Design 4. 
Replaced  J, 
Cl 
C2 
C3 
C4 
C5 
None replaced 
Pr (Just removal) 
Pr (Unjust removal) 
Pr (Just leave) 
Pr (Unjust leave) 
Pr (Just Action) 
Failed  ~  
Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5  All Good  
0.00746  0.00074  0.00069  0.00000  0.00298  0.00020 
0.00000  0.00442  0.00000  0.00000  0.00298  0.00010 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00437  0.00000  0.00000  0.00010 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00142  0.03955  0.00020 
0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.93480 
0.00746  0.00442  0.00437  0.00000  0.03955  0.05579 
0.00000  0.00074  0.00069  0.00142  0.00596  0.00059  0.00940 
0.93480 
0.00001 
0.00746  0.00442  0.00437  0.00000  0.03955  0.93480  0.99059 65 
Appendix B. Schematics of icemaker example 66 
Figure B.I. Schematic of assembled icemaker. 
-1  CI: Feeler Arm 
E: External Factor 
C5: Freezer 
Figure B.2. Exploded view of icemaker. 67 
Appendix C. Icemaker FMEA Document Table C. l. Icemaker FMEA Document [Henning 2000]. 
ailure  ailure Rate [per  ys Erred  ndication Code ( )  ndieation 1',,,,  lmillion evcles ~ i  "rrecl  observable) ComDOn~nt  Function  Failure Mode  somelimes  Sol 
!,!o ice, fcelcr arm in 
21,(6) I, Feeler arm  I , (9) ense icc le\'e! in bucket  roken off  Full  ucket at  times 
eeler arm - Switch 
, Switch linkage  ce overflow  onncction  tuck closed  Full  3)  ~ 
ee overflow  2) tuck closed  ntermittent  0  3) 
2) tuck open  'ull  0  I ~oice 
~w ice in bucket at  ,=,  41 tuck orxn  ntermillent  0  3 
, Switch  Activatcldeactivate ice maker  Ice overflow  2)  tuck closed  0 f"" 
lUck open  'ull  0  iNo  ice  I  3) 
mall ice, ice laye r in Hold  water. form ice geomet T) 
· Mold  and size  ~ rac k  Wania]  ucket  5)  ~ater leak  • (4) 
!water leak.  ~o  icc, ice layer in 
1, 4 Hole  f""  ucket  I  ..,'d  ompty  II 
~o  ice, water in 
High temp  reeze water  ~ot functionin  lFull  0  ucket :lttimes  I. (4)  21, !II · Freezer 
· Water Delivery  1No water in 
2) ystem  ill mold wI water  ~ot fu nctioning  'ull  I 5  ro'd  iNo icc 
low water  Pan ia]  mall ice  5  · (3) 
Icc stuck in  " 
I. (4)  21. (I  ) , Mold heatinl!. system Loosen ice  iNo heat  W UIl  0  hnold  iNo icc 
~ lslUC k in 
, Ice harvestin!.! svstem  emove icc fro m mold  ~ot  functionin  Wull  I. (4)  21,(1) 0  Id  iNo icc 
ce stuck in 
' ull · Ice timer  How proper freezing time  ~ot functioning  I  2)  0  fold  ~oice 
[roo fast  Wanial  5)  !water le:lk  mall  ice  • (4) 
~XTERNAL:  ~re:lle a consistent water level  mall  Mild  "  
'n the icc mold  Fisalignmcnt  efrigemtor Alignment  severity  7)  150  ~ma l1 icc 
~ma ll icc. icc layer in  ~ rge 
evere  Water leak  ,4  5)  misaliJ.!.nmcnt  40  ucket 69 
Appendix D. Distinguishability analysis of icemaker validation example Table D.I. Icemaker failure rate matrix. 
LOx 10-7  Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5  C6  C7  C8  C9  E 
11  0_00  0_00  0.00  0.99  9.90  0.00  69.30  19.80  0.00  0.00 
12  0.99  79.20  49.50  0.00  19.80  24_75  19.80  9.90  39.60  0.00 
13  0.00  108.90  49.50  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
14  0.00  69.30  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0_00  0.00 
15  0.00  0.00  0.00  7.92  0.00  44.55  0.00  0.00  14.85  39.60 
16  1.98  0_00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
17  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  148.50 
All good  0.03  2.60  1.00  0.09  0.30  0.70  0.90  0.30  0.55  1.90 
Table D.2. Exposure times for icemaker components. 
Ice maker cycles/day  3 
Ice maker expected life  15 years 
Component  Exposure time (hrs) Exposure time approximations 
Cl: Feeler arm  5475  20 min/cycle 
C2: Switch Linkage  2737.5  10 min/cycle 
C3: Switch  2737.5  10 min/cycle 
C4: Mold  32850  2 hours/cycle 
C5: Freezer  131400  Life of freezer 
C6: Water Delivery  4106.25  15 min/cycle 
C7: Mold Heater  1095  4 min/cycle 
C8: Ice Harvester  547.5  2 min/cycle 
C9: Ice Timer  32850  25% of life ofrefrigerator, continuous operation 
E: External Factor  657  Intermittent, happen .5% over lifetime 
......:J  o Table D.3. Component reliability computation. 
Component-I ndicatIon  Exposure T' Ime (h)  Pr(C'  Pr (C  b  d)  . r  1=200d)  j=  a 
Cl,I2  5475  0.999  0.001 
Cl,I6  5475  0.999  0.001 
C2,I2  2737.5  0.978  0.022 
C2,I3  2737.5  0.970  0.030 
C2,I4  2737.5  0.981  0.019 
C3,I2  2737.5  0.986  0.014 
C3,I3  2737.5  0.986  0.014 
C4,11  32850  0.997  0.003 
C4,I5  32850  0.974  0.026 
C5,11  131400  0.877  0.123 
C5,I2  131400  0.769  0.231 
C6,I2  4106.25  0.990  0.010 
C6,I5  4106.25  0.982  0.018 
C7,11  1095  0.992  0.008 
C7,I2  1095  0.998  0.002 
C8,Il  547.5  0.999  0.001 
C8,I2  547.5  0.999  0.001 
C9,I2  32850  0.877  0.123 
C9,I5  32850  0.952  0.048 
E,I5  657  0.997  0.003 
E,I7  657  0.990  0.010 Table D.4. Prior knowledge about component·  indication relationship. 
Pr(I1=faill Anyone Component = fail) 
Pr(I1=faill All Component = good) 
99% 
1% 
Pr(l2=fail I Anyone Component = fail) 
Pr(I2=fail I All Component = good) 
99% 
1% 
Pr(I3=fail I Anyone Component = fail) 
Pr(I3=fail I All Component = good) 
99% 
1% 
Pr(I4=fail I Anyone Component = fail) 
Pr(I4=fail I All Component = good) 
99% 
1% 
Pr(I5=fail I Anyone Component = fail) 
I Pr(l5=fail I All Component = good) 
99% 
1% 
Pr(I6=fail I Anyone Component = fail) 
IPr(I6=fail I All Component = good) 
99% 
1% 
~r(I7=fail I Anyone Component = fail) 
~r(I7=fail I All Component = good) 
99% 
1% 
-.....) 
N Table D.S. Component-indication joint probability matrix. 
Indication 
Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5  C6  C7  C8  C9  E  All good  Prob 
11  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.12  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.14 
12  0.00  O.oI  0.01  0.00  0.19  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.09  0.00  O.oI  0.32 
13  0.00  0.03  O.oI  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.05 
14  0.03 0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
15  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.00  0.01  0.10 
16  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  O.oI 
17  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  O.oI  O.oI  0.02 
All good  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.33  0.33  
Comp Prob  0.00  0.06  0.02  0.03  0.31  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.14  O.oI  0.39   1.00  I 
Table D.6. Icemaker replacement matrix. 
Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5  C6  C7  C8  C9  E  All good 
11  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
12  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  
13   0  I  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
14  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
15  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0 
16  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1 
17  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1 
All pass  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1 Table D. 7. Icemaker replacement probability matrix. 
Failed  ~ 
Replaced ,J...  Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5  C6  C7  C8  C9  E  All 
Cl  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
C2  0.00  0.05  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02 
C3  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
C4  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
C5  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.31  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.09  0.00  0.02 
C6  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
C7  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
C8  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
C9  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.00  0.01 
E  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 